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Market-Adjusted Options For Executive Compensation
Modern executive compensation packages usually contain incentive stock options. The intuition is simple and persuasive: Shareholders want the CEO to take actions that increase the value of the stock. Stock options give the CEO a strong financial incentive to increase the stock price.
They align the financial interests of the CEO with those of the shareholders and thus alleviate the agency conflict between shareholders and managers. A typical executive stock option grants the executive the right, for up to ten years, to buy a fixed amount of the firm's stock at the market price on the date that the option was granted.
However, this usual design violates one of the basic tenets of compensation theory, that compensation should be based on factors under the control of the CEO and not on environmental factors over which the CEO has no control (Eisenhardt, 1985) . 1 Stock returns are affected by many easily observable factors that are not under the control of the CEO, such as the return on the overall stock market. For example, it is absurd to think that executive performance declined by 25% when the stock market crashed in October 1987. Firms could easily design executive stock options with the purchase adjusted to remove the effects of overall stock market movements or of the stock returns of other firms in the same industry. Yet most firms do not. By failing to adjust the option exercise prices for such environmental factors, firms give away bonus windfalls to lucky CEOs who 2 just happen to hold the option during a bull market --and unjustly penalize CEOs who hold options during a bear market.
The concept that executive compensation should be tied to performance measured relative to peer firms is not new. Academic researchers and some compensation practitioners have advocated relative-performance-based compensation for years. However, to date no one has explained why most firms have not issued such adjusted options, despite their obvious appeal. We fill this gap by exploring the potential reasons why firms might choose not to issue such options. One of the main reasons stems from current accounting rules: Adjusting the option exercise prices for overall market movements perversely results in higher reported expenses than unadjusted options would have, even though the adjusted options are economically less expensive.
The paper also estimates the cost of this inefficient use of options. For the top 100 NYSElisted firms, the typical grant of an at-the-money call option with a five-year maturity would be, on average, 41% more expensive than would be necessary to reward the same amount of relative CEO performance.
This paper is organized as follows: The next section provides a brief review of compensation theory and practice. Despite strong theoretical advantages, virtually no major firms issue marketadjusted options. Section II explores various reasons why firms might not wish to issue such options, such as taxes and a desire to hide income. Existing accounting rules allow unadjusted options to show a zero cost, while forcing market-adjusted options to have a positive cost. Section III describes how to price the adjusted options, and estimates the added costs to the top 100 firms of not adjusting their options. Section IV concludes.
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I. Compensation Theory and Practice
Compensation Theory
The major economic theory of executive compensation is based on agency theory as developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) , Grossman and Hart (1983) , Holmström (1979 Holmström ( ,1982 , Oviatt (1988) , Tosi and Gomez-Mejia (1989) and others. The dissociation between the ownership and the management of a firm leads to a conflict of interest between the shareholders and the managers. The shareholders want to maximize the value of their shares. Since they can diversify easily through the capital markets, they have low or no risk aversion. The risk-averse managers hired to run the firm, however, seek to maximize their own personal utility functions. This divergence of interests may cause the managers to devote less effort to the company, divert resources from the company, or fail to undertake risky yet profitable investments. Since the shareholders have difficulty monitoring managers' actions, their task is to create a corporate governance scheme with incentives that will motivate managers to take the actions shareholders desire.
Although agency theory is quite plausible in conceptual terms, whether there is a causal and measurable relationship between the size of managerial compensation and firm performance is a controversial question (Gomez-Mejia, Tosi and Hinkin, 1987; Kerr and Bettis, 1987; Deckop, 1988; Gerhart and Milkovich, 1990; Kerr and Kren, 1992; Tosi and GomezMejia; Miller, 1995; Buchholtz and Ribbens, 1994; and Werner and Tosi, 1995) . Empirical examinations of the relationship between executive compensation and various proxies of performance have yielded mixed results. Tosi and Gomez-Mejia (1989) found that the variance in executive compensation that was explained by agency-theory-based models rarely exceeded 15 percent.
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Agency theory is not the only way to explore executive compensation. As viewed from a power perspective (Pound, 1995) , the shareholders of a modern corporation are quite fragmented and present little challenge to management decisions other than the distant threat of a takeover or a proxy fight. Rather than the shareholders designing a contract for the managers, the compensation committee of the boards of directors negotiates the contract. Holding only token stock ownership themselves, board members often have little incentive to restrain the CEO's salary. Their only concern may be that they not be embarrassed by being known as the board members who gave away the store. Indeed, the board members may be friends of the CEO and even owe their seats on the board to the CEO. Thus, management may extract rents from the firm up to the level which would make it cost effective for a raider to spend the money to take over the firm and capture the rents.
From a stakeholder perspective, providing stock options to executives is useful because it can help to align the interests of one class of stakeholders, the executives, with those of another important stakeholder group, the shareholders (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Jones, 1995) . The stock options are incentive pay in the sense that the owner of a property is likely to take better care of it than would a renter or a merely "caretaking" CEO.
From an executive's perspective, as the stock appreciates in value, his or her value to the corporation is enhanced. The company sees that the top executive is taking on a real stake in the advancement of the company's short-term and long-term objectives. For a small cost, the corporation has retained the executive's commitment and expertise for the long haul (Hill and Phan, 1991) .
One of the most perplexing problems in compensation theory is how to relate the different components of compensation --salary, bonuses, options, and other perquisites --to the "bottom line"
of annual profit-or-loss statements Crystal, 1991a; Brownstein and Panner, 1992 It can be argued that --human nature being what it is --the average employee, manager, or executive in business or industry enjoys doing a job well, wants to do so at all times, and would be insulted by the suggestion that increased compensation was desired to justify any extra effort on the job. Despite that reasonable presumption --and although physicists may determine that a push and a pull have equal power --management theorists recommend a combination of the two forces in designing wages and salaries: the push being the basic structure established at the time of employment and the pull being an added incentive system. The latter consists of periodic increases calculated in a merit-pay system for employees and lower management and in a structure of bonuses and stock-purchase options for higher management.
Whether executive compensation is an award for past performance or an incentive to improve in the future remains in question. Undoubtedly, a hard-headed board of directors views the incentive feature of a total-pay package, not as a reward for past accomplishment, but rather, hopefully, as a magnet pulling toward greater achievement. However, there may be diminishing returns in the progressive computations of incentives over the years. In other words, a ten percent incentive increase annually may not --and more probably cannot --pull that same amount of increased productivity out of a person year after year. Social scientists argue endlessly about the extent to which higher pay further motivates an executive.
Rather than attempt to answer all these questions once and for all, we narrow the scope of our analysis to the structure of executive stock options. Thus, we focus the camera in close-up on one of the frequent components of a CEO's pay package --namely, stock options, which, like bonuses, are intended to add "pay-for-performance" incentives to the CEO's pay package. However, the classic stock options really are more a form of profit sharing: If the shareholders reap an economic profit because the stock price goes up, some of the profit is shared with the CEO through stock option profits. Even if the higher stock price resulted from environmental factors such as an overall rise in stock prices or even a rise in oil prices, the CEO who holds options then benefits.
Removing such environmental influences by adjusting the options would move the compensation package further in the direction of pay-for-performance.
However, compensation is just one of the array of internal and external corporate governance mechanisms available to a firm (Walsh and Seward, 1990) . External control mechanisms include the threat of takeover, competition in the product markets, and monitoring by creditors; internal control mechanisms include monitoring by shareholders, directors, and even family members (in family owned firms). The threat of dismissal is another control mechanism. As noted by Rediker and Seth (1995) , the degree to which a particular mechanism is used by a firm is influenced by the other mechanisms in place. For example, executive stock options are extremely rare in Germany (Münchau and Dixon, 1996) , where the large universal banks are closely involved in firm affairs.
Compensation Practice
Compensation packages may include salary, bonus, and stock options. The bonus is usually set according to a formula based on how well the CEO has met certain performance measures set 7 forth by the board. These performance measures may include accounting-based measures such as exceeding specified return on equity targets, or by other measures such as market share. The
Conference Board (Klein, 1995) reports that 913 (87%) of the 1,048 largest publicly traded firms in the U.S. have compensation plans that permit granting stock options to executives. In every industry surveyed, the median option grant is larger than the CEO's salary
The compensation committee, which is usually chaired by an outside director, often relies on a professional compensation consultant to inform it about pay packages of executives in comparable firms. The pay package is designed not only to be an effective incentive for the executive to act in the shareholders' interest, but also to offer enough remuneration to keep the executive from accepting other employment offers. Therefore, the total value is made comparable to the pay packages offered by similar firms. See Crystal (1991b) for an account by a former compensation consultant of how executive compensation packages are set.
The stock options usually give the executive the right to purchase the company's stock at a fixed price for up to ten years. The purchase price is set at the stock's market price on the date of the option grant. However, the executive cannot sell the option and must wait for a certain period to elapse --often two or more years --before exercising the option. Furthermore, the options also may become void if the executive quits, dies, or is terminated for cause. In addition to (or instead of) options, the executive may be granted stock appreciation rights (SARs), which give the executive the same cash payoff as exercising an option and simultaneously selling the stock, but do not require that the executive actually purchase the stock.
Adjusting for Overall Market Movements
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Researchers into executive compensation have long been aware of the effect of environmental factors such as overall stock market returns on the performance of an individual company. Indeed, many empirical studies of executive compensation adjust for the effects of the overall stock market or of a group of peer firms. Examples include Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) , Murphy (1985) , Antle and Smith (1986), Kerr and Bettis (1987) , Platt (1987) , , Warner, Watts and Wruck (1988) , Weisbach (1988) , Gibbons and Murphy (1990) , and Janakiraman, Lambert and Larcker (1992) . Practitioners have also long been aware of the effect of outside factors on stock returns. Ubelhart (1985) of Hewitt Associates, a firm that specializes in compensation consulting,
proposed that executive stock options be adjusted for market movements. More recently Akhigbe, Madura and Tucker (1996) have proposed a similar market-adjusted option.
To date, however, virtually no major firms have issued adjusted stock options. The overwhelming majority of option-granting firms issue the standard unadjusted options, although there are rare exceptions in which firms have some type of adjustment: Unocal has an explicit "performance stock" program whose option-like payoff is a function of the stock performance of Unocal relative to a peer group of companies, in addition to providing standard executive stock options. Becton Dickenson has a plan in which the exercise price of future stock options is explicitly adjusted for the relative performance of the company's stock.
Not only are the options usually not adjusted for market performance, but firms' subsequent behaviors do much to mitigate the incentive feature of stock options. Firms sometimes reprice the options for firms when their stock prices have declined (Murphy, 1985; Gilson and Vetsuypens, 1993; Saly, 1994) . O'Byrne (1995) points out that setting executive compensation packages annually also has the effect of creating poor incentives for managers. Each year a company grants a compensation 9 package with a value designed to retain the services of the executive. The options included have an exercise price that is usually the stock price at the time of the option grant. If the stock price of the company has declined, the exercise price of the option is thus also lower, and frequently the company issues more options to offset the price decline. For example, as IBM's stock price declined during John Akers' tenure as CEO, the IBM board granted him additional options for shares at lower and lower exercise prices. By 1992, he stood to gain $17.6 million just for getting the stock price up to the level it had been when he became CEO.
II. Reasons For Not Adjusting Stock Options
The compelling logic of adjusting stock options for market-wide movements raises the Regression estimates of $ from past stock returns often have rather large standard errors, so that it may be difficult to agree upon the $.
Nevertheless, the implementation considerations are not insurmountable. Executive stock options and related stock appreciation rights are already complex instruments with numerous restrictions on selling and exercising the options. Incorporating an adjustment to the exercise price would not be a major increase in complexity.
Hidden salary. A firm may choose not to adjust the options it issues if it aims to disguise some of the compensation paid to its CEO. Since the overall trend of the market is expected to be upward over time (especially over the 10-year period for typical executive stock options), an unadjusted option gives the CEO at least some profit just from the overall upward trend of the stock market. Even if the CEO does relatively poorly and the stock goes up less than the overall stock market does, the CEO will still benefit from the options as long as he or she does not perform so badly that the stock price actually declines over the ten years. By not adjusting the purchase price of the options, the firm can pay less in salary and bonus to its CEO, avoiding public outcry or employee resentment over the CEO's compensation. However, when the option is granted, the members of the compensation committee can still say with a straight face that the CEO's interests are aligned with the shareholders.
Another reason for firms to disguise compensation in the form of options is that Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code eliminates the deductibility of salaries over $1 million unless the payments are tied to pre-established objective performance standards. Thus, corporations have a powerful tax incentive to cap salaries at $1 million and provide relatively more "performance-based" compensation. However, this mechanism does not explain why the many firms not constrained by this limitation do not adjust the options they grant so as to remove environmental factors such as overall stock market movements. Nor does it explain why firms did not issue market-adjusted options before Section 162(m) became effective in 1994.
Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia (1991) make the excellent point that executive compensation plans should be evaluated in light of the executive's entire portfolio. For example, overpayment that occurs by not adjusting stock options for price movements due to external factors may be partly offset by lower compensation elsewhere. If firms adjusted the exercise prices of executive stock options, they might have to increase other parts of the compensation package to maintain its total value and thus attract and keep good managers. However, the increased efficiency and fairness gained by purging noise from compensation in the form of classic executive stock options should make adjusting the options worthwhile even if there are no ex-ante cost savings.
Lowering the bar. Another possible reason for not adjusting the options is that firms wish to
"lower the bar" so that managers have a higher chance of obtaining some option-based compensation.
It is well known that for an incentive scheme to be effective, there must be a reasonable chance of obtaining the reward. If the possibility of receiving the reward is remote, it does little to motivate the employee. If relative performance is distributed symmetrically about the mean, then there is 50%
chance that an adjusted option will end up in the money. By not adjusting the option, the firm allows the expected upward nature of stock price movements to increase the expectation that the stock option will be in the money. Indeed, one would expect 63% of unadjusted options to be in the money after one year. 2 Once the option is in the money, there is a direct relationship between additions to stockholders wealth and additions to the manager's wealth. By making the option more likely to be in the money, the manager's will be more likely to be motivated at the margin to work more effectively for the shareholders.
However, if a firm really wanted to lower the bar in this way, it could easily do so by lowering the exercise price of an adjusted option to increase the odds that the option finishes in the money.
This adjustment would have the added benefit of removing the severe disincentive that occurs when the overall stock market drops, and makes sure that the manager is paid for performance and not rewarded (or penalized) for stock market noise.
Taxes. One potential impediment to adjusting stock option exercise prices is the tax treatment of so-called "qualified" incentive stock options in Section 422 of the Internal Revenue Code. A "qualified" option has no tax effect when granted; the profit at exercise is taxed as a capital gain when the stock is sold, if certain holding requirements are met; however, there is no deduction for the employer. A "non-qualified" option may have an immediate tax effect when granted, and the exercise of the option results in taxable income even if the stock is not sold.
3
In order to be a "qualified" incentive stock option, the option must meet various tests; one is that the exercise price of the option must be greater than or equal to the stock's fair market value on the option grant date. Adjusted options, which could ultimately have an exercise price lower than the price on the date of the grant, do not meet the test of a "qualified" option. However, the lack of "qualified" status has not stopped firms from issuing standard stock options to executives, and nonqualified option plans have become more popular in recent years subsequent to the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Thus, it is unlikely that consideration whether the options would be treated as "qualified"
for tax purposes has been important for firms' decisions not to issue market-adjusted options.
A related tax-related motivation for not adjusting options may stem from a desire to defer current income into the future and convert it into a capital gain, which would presumably be taxed at a lower rate. However, the willingness of firms to offer non-qualified options which do not offer the prospect of capital gains treatment calls this argument into question as well.
Accounting. In our view, the most likely reason that U.S. firms have chosen not to adjust the exercise prices of their stock options stems from the incentives created by the accounting treatment of stock options. The primary accounting rules that govern employee stock options are Accounting
Research Bulletin (ARB) 43 and Accounting Principles Board (APB) Opinion 25. In the words of Coopers and Lybrand (1995: 3) , "Most companies have designed their stock-based compensation plans around these accounting rules to avoid expense recognition."
These rules refer to the classic executive stock option as a fixed option, because both the number of shares and the exercise price are fixed at the date of the grant. Under APB 25, the accounting cost of the option is measured on the option grant date as the difference between the stock price and the exercise price. If the exercise price is set as the stock price on the date of the grant, which is the common practice, then the cost of a fixed option that is reported to shareholders under APB 25 is zero.
However, if the exercise price is unknown (as it is in the adjusted option discussed here), then the option is referred to as a variable option, and the reported expense is calculated differently. Each year during the service period, the cost is estimated as the difference between the current exercise price and the current stock price. Since the stock price is expected to increase during this period, the expected accounting expense is positive. (If the stock drops below the exercise price, a negative expense is not recorded.) Thus, even though a market-adjusted option would be less costly than a standard option, the accounting treatment perversely allows a firm to report lower expense --zero --for the standard option.
More recently, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (1995) issued Financial Accounting
Standard 123: Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation, which modifies the existing rules that were codified in ARB 43 and APB 25. The new rule encourages --but does not require --firms to recognize as an expense the value of employee stock options using an option pricing model.
According to Coopers and Lybrand (1995) , most firms will probably not choose to adopt the expense recognition feature of FAS 123, because it will result in lower reported earnings. The firms will continue to use the methodology of APB 25. However, firms that do not adopt FAS 123 will have to disclose the value of options granted in a footnote.
FAS 123 treats fixed and variable price options consistently: The expense of the option is to be calculated with an option pricing model and recognized on the date of the option grant. This feature would remove the accounting disincentive to issuing market-adjusted options. However, since many, if not the majority, of firms will choose not to adopt the expense recognition features of FAS 123, the accounting disincentive remains.
III The Cost of Not Adjusting Options
A. Influence of Outside Factors on Stock Returns
To estimate the added cost from not adjusting executive stock options, it is first useful to examine how much of the performance of a company's stock is driven by outside factors. The classic Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), for which Sharpe (1964) shared the Nobel Prize, can provide some insight. The CAPM holds that the return on an asset, R i , can be expressed as a function of the so-called risk-free rate of interest, R f , the return on the overall stock market, R m , and the firms exposure to market risk, $, with an error term, ,, that contains the results of the executive's performance and other variables:
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Please place Table 1 approximately here.
The very similar market model does not require the existence of a risk-free rate, but just holds that the return on a stock is related to the overall stock market return:
The CAPM and similar models form the basis for numerous event studies, although there is considerable controversy over how well the CAPM describes stock returns. (Fama and French, 1992; and Frankfurter, 1995) . Other models, such as the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) of Ross (1976) , decompose stock returns into many separate factors. Although academics continue to investigate and debate the merits of various asset pricing models, there is considerable consensus that stock returns are affected by factors outside the firm itself.
Even the simple one factor market model can explain a substantial fraction of a stock's total return. Applying the market model regression to 2,261 NYSE and AMEX-listed firms on the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) monthly database from 1989 to 1993 yields a mean adjusted R 2 of 13.8%. For the largest 100 firms, overall stock market movements explained 31.8% --almost a third --of the movements in individual stock prices. See Table 1 for more details. Multiple factor models and models that take other factors such as industry returns into consideration can explain an even larger fraction of stock returns.
B. Pricing Adjusted Options
It is not difficult to price market-adjusted options using modern option pricing techniques.
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A market-adjusted option is an example of an option to substitute one asset for another and can be priced using the formula developed by Margrabe (1978) . To see this, note that in a standard call option one exchanges a fixed amount of cash for the asset. For a market-adjusted option, one exchanges an amount of cash that is tied to a market index, which is economically equivalent to exchanging the index for the asset. The value of an adjusted option, C, is thus:
where S 1 is the price of the index
S 2 is the price of the stock q 1 is the dividend yield on the index q 2 is the dividend yield on the stock T is the time to maturity 
Please place Table 2 approximately here.
In this case, the F for the adjusted option becomes:
The difference in cost between a market adjusted option and an unadjusted option can be huge. For example, using Black-Scholes (1973) call value for an at-the-money, five-year call option on a non-dividend-paying, $40 stock with a 30% volatility and a 6% risk-free rate is $15.19. 5 If the stock had a $ of 1 and the market had a volatility of 20%, the market-adjusted option would cost $7.90 -approximately half the cost of the unadjusted option. Table 2 presents the results of applying this model to the 100 largest NYSE-listed firms at the end of 1993. For these firms, the unadjusted option is on average 41% more expensive than the adjusted option. Note, however, that in a few cases, the unadjusted option actually costs less. This can occur if the stock has a particularly high (or low) $ and low idiosyncratic risk.
IV. Conclusions and Implications
One of the basic tenets of compensation theory is that one should not reward or penalize an agent for easily observable factors that are outside the agent's control. Thus, it makes sense that a company issuing stock options to motivate its managers would want to adjust the exercise price of such options to remove environmental influences that are outside the control of the manager, such as the general level of stock prices. Adjusting options would allow firms to reward the same amount of relative performance at less ex-ante cost, or for the same ex-ante cost to reward even higher relative performance. Not adjusting the typical executive stock option results in an option that is on average 41% more expensive for the largest NYSE firms than an option adjusted for the overall movement of stock prices.
Few firms have issued such adjusted options, despite their compelling theoretical attractiveness. The primary reason for this is that the standard executive stock options have been designed to avoid recognizing their cost on the income statement under present accounting rules.
Adjusted options, because they are classified as variable price options, may result in charges on the income statement and thus depress reported earnings. This different accounting treatment gives firms that are concerned about reported earnings a strong incentive to choose the less-efficient standard options rather than a market-adjusted option.
One obvious implication for practitioners who design accounting rules, such as the FASB and the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), is that they should consider the impact of accounting rules on the way executive stock options are written. The provisions of FAS 123 that allow firms to continue to use APB 25 methods for valuing employee stock options create perverse incentives to use the more expensive unadjusted option because it has less impact on reported earnings.
The reasoning outline above also provides one explanation for the low fits found in previous empirical studies of the relationship between executive compensation and performance. Since the price of a company's stock is affected by measures outside the control of the manager, the use of standard stock options provides noisy compensation.
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The accounting treatment of employee stock options has been a factor in their design. Thus, the analysis presented here can be used to predict that the firms that do adopt FAS 123 will be more likely to adjust their options, since the adoption of FAS 123 removes the accounting advantage of unadjusted options.
If the accounting rules are changed to remove the bias against adjusting options, this analysis also predicts which firms will be more likely to adjust the options: The cost of not adjusting the options is largest for firms with low idiosyncratic risk relative to their total risk --most notably, larger firms. This table presents summary statistics on the relative value of standard stock options versus adjusted stock options at the end of 1993 for the 100 largest firms (by market capitalization) on the CRSP NYSE/AMEX file. For each firm, the value of a standard five-year, at-the-money option was calculated by using the Black-Scholes (1973) option pricing formula with the Merton (1973) adjustment for dividends. The volatility was obtained from the previous 60 months of historical returns. The risk-free rate was assumed to be 6%. Dividend yields were calculated using the actual dividends paid in 1993. The values of the adjusted options were calculated as described in the text. The statistic given is the ratio of the unadjusted option to the adjusted option for both five-and tenyear maturities. Although the typical executive stock option is for a ten-year maturity, we also present the results for five years to reflect the potential effects of early exercise. 
Appendix One Option Valuation Formulas
The classic Black and Scholes (1973) formula, with Merton's (1973) As described in the text, the market-adjusted option is a special case of Margrabe's (1978) option to exchange one asset for another:
If the initial exercise price is set to the current stock price (S 1 =S 2 ) and both the stock price and the index are calculated with dividends reinvested (q 1 = q 2 = 0), the formula simplifies to:
Because log(=S 2 /S 1 ) = 0, d 1 becomes 
